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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized. 
Motor Vehicle Act.— Section 41-6a-1604 (2) provides: 
(2)(a) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, and any other 
vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, shall 
be equipped with at least two tail lamps and two or more red reflectors 
mounted on the rear. 
(b) (i) Except as provided under Subsections (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c), and 
Section 41-6a-1612, all stop lamps or other lamps and reflectors mounted 
on the rear of a vehicle shall display or reflect a red color. 
2 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution 8 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 8 
Section 41 -6a-1604 (2) 9,11 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) 9 
Devenpeck v. Alford. 543 U.S. 146 (2004). 125 S.Ct. 588 13 
Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128,138 (1978) 12 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 (Utah 1994) 9 
United States v. Robinson. 414 U.S. 218,236 (1973) 12 
State v. Rovbal. 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986) 12 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985) 12 
State v. Chism. 2005 Ut App 41,107 P.3d 706 (2005) 12 
State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997) 13 
State v. Warren . 2003 UT 36,78 P.3d 590 (2003) 12 
Terry v.Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) 11 
Whren v. United States. 517 U.S. 806,813 (1996) 12 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
3 
Authority for this appeal is found in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated 
Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
The question presented addresses whether the Court's obligation is to review 
the facts objectively or whether the Court is bound by the officer's subjective beliefs. 
The Courts, both federal and state, have been reluctant to adopt the position taken 
by the trial court here. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Judgment being appealed from is a judgment of criminal conviction for 
the offense of 'Possession of a Controlled Substance', a third degree felony. 
Defendant entered a 'Sery Plea' which was accepted by the Court. The 
defendant reserved his right to appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence arguing that the officer conducted an illegal 
search/detention of him. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The matter came before the Court on the defendant's motion to 
suppress which was denied. 
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At the preliminary hearing, the officer testified that he stopped the defendant 
for a tail light violation. Transcript Preliminary Hearing Page 6 Line 1-5. The officer 
testified the tail light emitted a pinkish red hue. Transcript Preliminary Hearing Page 
6 Line 2-4. At the hearing, the officer identified the tail light lens cover as a plastic 
red folder. Transcript Preliminary Hearing Page 10 Line 10/Page 10 Line 20/ 
Page11 Line 13.. At the hearing, the lens cover identified by the officer was noted to 
be red in color and it also emitted a red light. Court Order & Findings Paragraph 9. 
Defendant argued the stop was illegal and the defendant was operating his 
vehicles in conformance with the laws of the State of Utah. Thus the officer had no 
justification to stop the defendant for the tail lamp violation. 
At the suppression hearing, the State claimed the defendant could not 
challenge the officer's report by a physical demonstration of placing a light behind 
the red folder to indicate the color of the light emitted. When observed, it was noted 
that a red light was emitted. Suppression Hearing Transcript/Court Order & Findings, 
Page 3. First Paragraph. 
The State argued successfully that the Court must disregard the coloring of 
the light emitted and the covering itself that the Court was bound by the officer's 
testimony. The Court agreed and found that although the folder was red, the tape 
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used to join the folder to the car was red, and the light emitted was red, the Court 
was controlled by the officer's testimony. Suppression Hearing. Court Order & 
Findings. The State conceded that the evidence demonstrated that one tail light was 
dimmer and pinker than the other. Page 5 Line 18-19. Suppression Hearing. 
The Courts findings and Order supporting its denial of the defendant's motion 
provided: 
1. Officer Martinez testified that he initiated a traffic stop of the 
defendant's van on April 19,2005. 
2. The sole basis for the stop was the van's tail lamp. 
3. The officer noted that the right taillight was dimmer than the left 
and appeared to have a pinkish hue. See also Page 5 Line 
15-17 of Suppression Hearing. 
4. The officer stopped the van and requested his driver's license, 
registration and insurance. The officer found the defendant to 
have a valid license for Arizona but his license to drive in 
Utah was revoked. 
5. The defendant was arrested and searched. The officer located 
a pipe in his pocket and additional contraband in the van. 
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6. Upon cross-examination at the hearing, the officer described 
the right tail lamp as having a red folder (plastic) over the tail 
light. It was attached with red tape. 
7. The officer noted no dangers that the taillight presented. 
8. He did not note any difficulties in seeing the tail lamp but stated 
the right light did not match the left. The difference in the 
color of the two lamp lights was the sole basis for the stop. 
9. At the suppression hearing, the defense introduced as an 
exhibit the red folder that had been placed over the taillight. 
The defense placed a flashlight behind the red folder 
demonstrating the light produced. The light emitted was red 
in color, contrary to the officer's testimony that it had a 
pinkish hue. 
At the suppression hearing, the State objected to the exhibition of the light 
emitted and argued that the officer's testimony is conclusive and the Court must 
disregard the coloring of the folder and the light emitted. The Court agreed and held 
itself bound by the officer's testimony. The Court found that although the folder was 
red, the tape was red and the light emitted was red, the Court was bound by the 
officer's conclusion that the light emitted pinkish hue. Court Order & Finding. Page 2 
Last paragraph. See addendum for official order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant has standing to assert Fourth Amendment and Article I 
Section 14 rights. The stop of the defendant's van was based solely on the fact that 
one tail lamp failed to emit the same color of red as the other. The Court has an 
obligation to review the officer's basis for stopping the defendant under a 
constitutional analysis and is not bound by the officer's subjective belief. The 
standard to be applied is an 'objective' standard and not merely the officer's opinion. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant asserts that the arrest /search of the defendant and his van by 
officers violated the defendant's constitutional rights granted him by the United 
States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows: 
8 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized. 
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupant constitute a 'seizure' 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention auite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653(1979). 
To determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable, the Court makes two 
inquiries: "(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception? and (2) Was 
the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the interference in the first place?" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 (Utah 
1994). 
Appellant challenges the Court's finding that the officer's stop of the 
defendant was justified at its inception. Here the traffic stop is made upon the 
officer's subjective belief that there was a lighter shade of red on one taillight as 
opposed to the left. He believed the right had more of a pinkish hue. Based on this, 
he stopped of the van. 
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The presence of tail lamps is required by the Motor Vehicle Act.. See 
section 41-6a-1604 (2)which provide: 
(2)(a) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, and any other 
vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, shall 
be equipped with at least two tail lamps and two or more red reflectors 
mounted on the rear. 
(b) (i) Except as provided under Subsections (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c), and 
Section 41-6a-1612, all stop lamps or other lamps and reflectors mounted 
on the rear of a vehicle shall display or reflect a red color. 
The Court found that the officer's subjective perception of the tail lamp 
coloring was controlling despite the Court's findings that the taillight was in 
conformance with statutory requirements. Page 5 Line 15-17, Suppression 
Hearing. See Court's finding, Page 3. 
The officer here noted the color of one tail light differed from the other. At the 
preliminary hearing, he testified that the right tail light was dimmer than the left. At the 
hearing, he testified that it had a pinkish hue as compared to the other. 
'Red' is defined by Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary as: 
. . .flushed with ruddy or florid; of a coppery hue; bloodshot (c) in the color 
range between a moderate range and a ruseet or bay; tinged with red: 
reddish... 
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'Pink' is defined as: 
.. .any of a group of colors bluish red to red in hue ... 
By definition, 'pink' is a lighter shade of the color red. The stopping of the 
defendant's van was based on the officer's color gradation of the color 'red'. 
The statute (41-6a-1604 (2)) requires that the tail lights "display or reflect a red 
color". The statute does not mandate a perfect color of red. Being dimmer or failing to 
match the companion tail light should not establish a basis for stopping the defendant. 
He, by the State's concession, one tail light was dimmer than the other. 
The Court's ruling suggests that the officer's perceptions are not subject to 
review by the Court. The Court upheld the stop based solely on the officer's 
subjective belief. The Court refused to apply an objective analysis; discounting the 
Court's own perception. 
The question presented addresses whether the Court's obligation is to review 
the facts objectively or whether the Court is bound by the officer's subjective beliefs. 
The Courts, both federal and state, have been reluctant to adopt the position taken 
by the trial court here. 
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,88 S.Ct.1868 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court 
found the officer's, subjective belief not enough alone to justify a protective frisk. In 
l i 
fact, in Whren v. United States. 517 U.S. 806,813 (1996) the Court reviewed 
previous decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with this issue. They found no 
precedent for an argument that the reasonableness of a traffic stop depends upon 
the subjective intent of the individual officers. This is contrary to the position taken 
by the Court here. 
In Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128,138 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court 
held the officer's subjective belief does not override a Court's finding that an 
objective standard was met. See also United States v. Robinson. 414 U.S. 218,236 
(1973). 
In Terry, the Court stated that an officer must point to articulable facts to 
warrant an objective finding of a legitimate search. 392 U.S. at 22. In Terry frisk 
cases, Utah law has required an objective analysis. State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 
293 (Utah 1986); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985). 
In State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36,78 P.3d 590 (2003), the Utah Supreme 
Court mandated an objective analysis be made. They also found the majority of 
jurisdictions have concluded that the officer's subjective opinion plays a limited role 
but the legality of the search must be objectively reasonable. 
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This also appears to be also the holding by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), 125 S.Ct. 588. There the accused was 
impersonating a police officer but arrested under a violation of privacy statute (taping 
the officer's initial conversation). The Court held the arresting officer's state of mind 
is irrelevant to justify an arrest under the probable cause standard. 
In balancing the need for effective law enforcement against individual rights, 
the Court found an objective standard more aligned with society's interest than a 
standard dependent upon the officer's subjective impressions. 
The holdings in both Utah State Courts and Federal Courts reject the officer's 
subjective evaluations as a standard. The rights granted under the Fourth 
Amendment and Art. I Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution are better protected 
by the objective standard rather than having constitutional rights vacillate dependent 
upon the officer's subjective impressions. 
This would also comport with the holding in State v. Chism, 2005 Ut App 41, 
107 P.3d 706 (2005). There the Court concluded that the officer's subjective 
impression of the defendant's age could not take precedent over a state-issued 
identification card representing him of age to possess cigarettes.. The Court 
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concluded that the officer's personal impression of the defendant's age was 
irrelevant there. 
Similarly in State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997),where this Court 
noted that the assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective 
standard. The Court warned that a test applied by the trial court here could bring 
about an unconstitutional result. Fourth Amendment rights cannot vary in 
accordance with an officer's belief. This danger is not one society should not be 
asked to uphold. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court accepted the officer's conclusions that the tail light violated state 
statute despite the Court's observation that the tail light met the statutory mandate. 
The Court found the plastic folder taped to the light was red in color and reflected a red 
color. 
A stop of a motor vehicle cannot be made based on the officer's subjective 
belief that one tail light is dimmer than the other. The Court has an obligation to view 
the evidence objectively and make a determination independent of the officer's 
14 
opinion. The Court's own objective observation of the tail light covering is controlling 
and not overcome by the officer's subjective judgment of the color red. 
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Addendum to Brief 
1. Court Findings and Order. 
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The defendant motioned the Court to suppress evidence. The defendant argued 
that the officer herein did not have sufficient cause to stop the defendant. The defendant 
asserted that this was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights as secured by 
"both the Federal and State Constitutions. 
Officer Martinez testified at the preliminary hearing that he had initiated a traffic 
stop of the defendant's van on April 19, 2005. The sole basis to make the stop was van's 
taillight. He testified that after midnight at 12:45 he noted a van traveling westbound on 
400 North in Orem City. 
He noted the right taillight was dimmer than the left taillight and appeared to be 
pinkish. The officer than requested his driver's license, registration and insurance. The 
officer checked the license and noted it being valid in Arizona but his license had been 
revoked in Utah. 
The officer than arrested Mr. Bunting. Pursuant to the search of Mr. Bunting, he 
found a glass pipe in his left front pocket and noticed the pipe to have white residue in it. 
Additional contraband was then later located in the van. 
Upon cross-examination, the officer described the right taillight has having red 
folder tape over the right tail lamp with also red tape. This was also indicated by the 
officer's report. The officer did not testify relating neither to any dangers that the taillight 
presented nor to any other defects in the equipment upon the van. The officer did not 
indicated that he could not see the taillight but that it did not match the left taillight in 
coloring. The difference in the coloring of the two taillights was the only basis for the 
stop. 
The defense then introduced an exhibit which was the red folder that had been 
placed over the taillight. It was the same coloring as the officer noted that evening. 
The officer suggested that the red folder with the red tape produced a pinkish hue. 
After the defense filed a motion to suppress, the Court set a motion hearing on the 
suppression issue. At the hearing, the defense placed a flashlight behind the red folder 
and the light emitted was, in fact, red. This was contrary to the officer's observation of a 
pink hue. 
The State objected to the exhibition of the light emitted from the red folder and 
argued the only evidence the Court had before it was the officer's testimony. The State 
argued that the Court is limited in its findings by the officer's testimony and the Court 
must disregard the coloring of the light emitted via the flashlight to the red folder. The 
Court was thereby bound by the officer's testimony. 
The Court agrees with the State's position and finds that although the folder was 
red, the tape was red, and the light emitted from via the use of the flashlight was red, the 
Court is limited by the officer's observation. 
Pursuant to these findings, the Court denies the defendant's motion to suppress. 
The Court rules that since the officer noted a pinkish hue to the tailiight, the officer was 
justified in making this traffic stop and the resulting discovery of contraband is 
admissible into evidence and not a violation of the defendant's rights as guaranteed under 
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art I Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. . ^ , 
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